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I. INTRODUCTION
There is a crisis of patent quality. Patents are being issued that are
vague and overbroad, lack novelty, and fail the constitutional mandate
"[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts." 1 Low quality
patents generate excessive litigation and confer the economic rewards
of monopoly on patent holders while providing little benefit to the
public.2
• Professor and Director, Institute for Information Law & Policy, New York Law School;
McClatchy Visiting Associate Professor, Communications Department, Stanford University;
Visiting Scholar, Annenberg School of Communication, University of Pennsylvania. The
Community Patent Review project can be found at http://dotank.nyls.edu/communitypatent.
I. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 8.
2.See A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 46 (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds.,
2004); see also ADAM 8. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW
OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS 1-8 (2004)
(arguing that recent changes in the patent system have resulted in increased litigation and a
greater threat of litigation, creating a net social loss); Shubha Ghosh & Jay Kesan, What Do
Patents Purchase? In Search of Optimal Ignorance in the Patent Office, 40 Hous. L. REV.
1219, 1227-35 (2004) (discussing the social costs of low quality patents); Editorial, The
Problem with Patents, WALL ST. J., Mar. 29, 2006, at A 18 ("If bad or dubious patents pro-
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This paper argues that access to information is the crux of the
patent quality problem. Patent examiners currently make decisions
about the grant of a patent that will shape an industry for a twentyyear period 3 on the basis of a limited subset of available information.
Examiners may neither consult the public, talk to experts, nor, in
many cases, even use the Intemet. 4 Furthermore, applicants often fail
to draft clear applications; they are not obligated to supply the patent
examiner with information necessary to make an informed decision. 5
The burden falls on the United States Patent and Trademark Office
("USPTO"), whose employees must search for and find the relevant
technological antecedents, known as "prior art," against which they
6
compare and assess the claimed invention.
As James Rumsey remarked in a letter to Thomas Jefferson in
1789, the issuance of patents is "more within the information of a
board of academical [sic] professors, and a previous refusal of a pat7
ent would better guard our citizens against harassments by lawsuits."
Indeed, Jefferson, the first patent examiner, consulted with Joseph
Hutchinson, Professor of Chemistry at the University of Pennsylvania,
8
to seek his advice before issuing a patent on an alchemical process.
By contrast, today's patent system replaces expert "academical"
input with a centralized and isolated expert-bureaucrat evaluating applications on the basis of a legal fiction - from the viewpoint of the
"Person Having Ordinary Skill in the Art" ("PHOSITA"). 9 These pat10
11
ent examiners are underpaid and overworked. They labor indeliferate, they can have the opposite of their intended effect, which is to promote and reward
innovation.").
3. 35 U.S.C. § I 54(a)(2) (2000).
4. See UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURES§ 904.02(c) (8th ed. 2001) (hereinafter MPEP].
5. See Lee Petherbridge, Positive Examination, 46 IDEA 173, 182-83 (2006).
6. See id. (arguing for a reduction in the information costs assumed by the US PTO).
7. E.C. Walterscheid, Thomas Jefferson and the Patent Act of 1793, 40 ESSAYS IN HIST.
(1998), http://etext.virginia.edu/journals/EH/EH40/walter40.html (quoting Letter from
James Rumsey to Thomas Jefferson (June 6, 1789), in 15 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 171 (John Catanzariti et al. eds., 1990)).
8. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Hutchinson (Mar. 12, 1791 ), in l 9 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 614 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1974) (consulting with a professor
of chemistry in connection with a patent on a desalination process).
9. 35 U.S.C. § I 03(a) (2000); see Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Obvious to Whom? Evaluating
Inventions from the Perspective of PHOSITA, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 885, 886 (2004)
("(The language of§ 103] seems to call for evaluations of nonobviousness from the perspective of ordinary practitioners who are contemporaries of the inventor in the relevant
technological community.").
I 0. A patent examiner gets paid less than half the salary of a first-year associate prosecuting patents for a large law firm. According to the US PTO, a patent examiner generally starts
at levels between GS-5 to GS-9, where the salary is between $35,273 and $66,011, and can
be promoted to GS-14, with a maximum salary of$122,367. USPTO: FAQs, Question 17,
http://www.usptocareers.gov/faq.asp (last visited Oct. 7, 2006); USPTO Specialty Salary
Rate Table, http://www.usptocareers.gov/salaryrates.asp (last visited Oct. 7, 2006). Entry
level salaries for first-year associates in large New York law firms are approximately
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pendently under a backlog approaching one million applications, 12
with no more than eighteen to twenty hours to review each one. 13
There is an absence of communication with the scientific community,
and examiners are not required to have advanced degrees in the sciences.14 With increasing automation, examiners have less need, and
hence limited opportunity, to communicate with each other directly,
resulting in a growing information deficit.
Rejecting input from experts and remaining unaccountable to the
scientific community produces problems with information quality and
transparency at the USPTO. The institutionalized isolation of expertise produces an information deficit that results in poor quality patents. The reluctance to use outside science translates into undue
reliance on centralized structures of procedural expertise and decision-making. This distrust of outside knowledge is compounded by an
inability to effectively and efficiently engage experts. Thus, the patent
15
quality problem is, at least in part, a problem of information access.
This dearth of information - striking in view of the explosion of
informational resources created by the Internet age - cannot be
solved through judicial review. At present, even though an overwhelming percentage of patent applications are granted (with some
estimates as high as ninety-seven percent), 16 patent owners enjoy a
$145,000. See Ellen Rosen, For New lawyers, the Going Rate Has Gone Up, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 1, 2006, at C7.
11. The US PTO has the same number of examiners yet twice the number of applications
as the European Patent Office. See JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 2, at 131.
12. At the end of 2005, the number of pending patent applications was 885,002 and rising. See US PTO, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 120 tbl.3 {2005) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT], available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2005/
2005annualreport.pdf; see also Review of U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Operations,

Including Analysis of Government Accountability Office, Inspector General, and National
Academy of Public Administration Reports: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts. the
Internet, and Intel/. Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, I 09th Cong. 14 (2005) (statement of Jon W. Dudas, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property; Director,
USPTO) ("(W]ithout any change to the system, the backlog of applications awaiting a first
review by an examiner is expected to grow from the current level of approximately 600,000
to over 1,000,000 by 2010.").
13. See U.S. Gov'T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GA0-05-720, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
USPTO HAS MADE PROGRESS IN HIRING EXAMINERS, BUT CHALLENGES TO RETENTION
REMAIN 28 (2005) ("Depending on the type of patent and the skill level of the examiner,
each examiner is expected to process an average of 87 applications per year at a rate of I 9
hours per application."); Kevin Maney, Patent Applications So Abundant that Examiners
Can't Catch Up, USA TODAY, Sept. 21, 2005, at 38.
14. "[A] degree from an accredited college or university in Electrical Engineering, Computer Engineering, Computer Science, Mechanical Engineering, Chemical Engineering,
Material Science Engineering, Biology, [or] Organic Chemistry" will allow an individual to
become a patent examiner. USPTO: FAQs, supra note IO.
15. See Petherbridge, supra note 5, at 178 ("[T]ransactions involving questionable patents ... can be productively considered as problems of information costs and information
cost allocation."); see also Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA.
L. REV. 465 (2004).
16. See Cecil D. Quillen et al., Continuing Patent Applications and Performance of the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office - Extended, 12 FED. CIR. B.J. 35, 36 (2002); see also
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presumption of validity. The Federal Circuit, the specialty patent appeals court, rules in favor of patent holders more often than not in
infringement actions. 17 Yet contrary to prevailing theory, "Daubertizing"18 agency decision-making by lowering the current standard of
judicial review over USPTO decisions is too slow, too irregular, and
too late in the game to solve the problem, 19 especially as judicial review cannot occur until examination concludes, which can take several years. 20
Other reform proposals are also inadequate. Those that call for ex
post solutions, such as post-grant administrative review to "goldplate" important patents, 21 require improved mechanisms for accessing the information necessary to make the patentability determination.
Similarly, proposals to change the statutory standards of patent examination, revisit the scope of patentable subject matter, or modify
the definition of obviousness do not eliminate the need to address the
information deficit. They also require extraordinary political capital to
move through Congress. Even regulatory proposals that require applicants to search more thoroughly for the prior art still require significant political support and assume that applicants, including small
inventors, have the ability to find all the relevant information.
Patently-0, http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/articles_and__publicationslindex.html (Aug.
26, 2004).
17. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, How Federal Circuit Judges Vote in Patent
Validity Cases, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 745, 754 (2000) ("Judges appointed after 1982 voted
to hold a patent valid 164 times out of298, or 55.0% of the time."); see also Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV.
I, 26-30 (1989); but see Donald R. Dunner, The United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit: Its First Three Years, 13 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 186 (1985) ("[W]hat [the results] show is anything but a bias in favor of patents - either from a validity or an infringement standpoint."). As Professors Dan L. Burk and Mark Lemley remark, "the Federal
Circuit has bent over backwards to find biotechnological inventions nonobvious, even if the
prior art demonstrates a clear plan for producing the invention." Dan L. Burk & Mark A.
Lemley, ls Patent law Technology-Specific? 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 1156 (2002).
18. See Alan Charles Raul & Julie Zampa Dwyer, "Regulatory Daubert": A Proposal to
Enhance Judicial Review of Agency Science by Incorporating Daubert Principles into Administrative law, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7 (2003) (arguing that the principles of
Daubert should be applied to administrative agencies "to encourage reviewing judges to be
less deferential, and thus more probing, of agency science."); see also Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (I 993).
19. See Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend Patents:
Why litigation Won't Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent
Review Might Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943 (2004) (arguing that skewed incentives
prevent litigation from being a reliable tool for assessing patent validity).
20. See Ghosh & Kesan, supra note 2, at 1226 ("[C]ourts can only review the validity of
a patent application ifit is the subject of an opposition or an infringement action."). Average
pendancy times vary by technology, from two years to over three and a half years. See ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 121tbl.4.
21. See. e.g., Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, I 09th Cong. § 9 (2005); Mark Lemley et al., What to Do About Bad Patents?, REGULATION, Winter 2005-2006, at 10, 13 (arguing for "post-grant opposition," described as "a process by which parties other than the
applicant would have the opportunity to request and fund a thorough examination of a recently issued patent").
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What if we could reform the application process and guarantee
better patents before costly litigation? What if we could ensure that
only the most worthwhile inventions received twenty years of monopoly rights? What if we could offer a way to protect inventors' investments while still safeguarding the market from bad patents? What if
we could give the scientific community a voice in determining
whether an invention was truly novel or obvious? What if we could
make informed decisions about the scientifically complex issues
posed by patent law before the fact?
This Article addresses the contention that an information deficit is
the central problem in the patent review process by proposing a new
reform model that might revolutionize the process of patent examination. This proposal for open patent examination (nicknamed "Peer-toPatent") separates scientific from legal decision-making. By means of
an online network, the scientific community provides what it knows
best - scientific information relevant to determining the novelty and
non-obviousness of a patent application. With her deep knowledge of
the pertinent statutory standards, the patent examiner then uses that
input to make a legal determination ofpatentability. In this model, the
patent examiner remains the ultimate arbiter.
This model for administrative decision-making has the potential
to remedy the information deficit and improve patent quality. Its enactment requires no statutory or regulatory changes. By redesigning
the model for patent examination, this proposal points the way towards a new approach for administrative law, not by altering statutory
or judicial standards, but by improving agency institutional competence. It goes beyond traditional administrative practices like peer
review by combining expertise with openness. The model also improves on notice-and-comment rulemaking by making citizen participation more open and collaborative and the legal decision-making
process more transparent and accountable to a broad community of
self-selected experts.
This Article focuses on patent examination as administrative
practice. 22 It shifts the focus to the institutional competence of the
agency and highlights new opportunities for patent reform. At this
juncture, when neither Congress 23 nor the U.S. Supreme Court24 is

22. Cf Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who's Afraid of the APA? What the Patent
System Can learn from Administrative law, 95 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming Nov. 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=897307; Kristen Osenga, Entrance Ramps, Tolls, and Express lanes - Proposals for Decreasing Traffic Congestion in
the Patent Office, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 119 (2005) (proposing multi-tiered patent application and examination system); Farrell & Merges, supra note 19 (arguing that judicial review
alone cannot fix the patent problem and advocating administrative solutions).
23. Patent lawyer, academic, and blogger Prof. Dennis Crouch writes: "Substantive patent reform legislation is dead for the year." Patently-0, http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/
patent_legislation/index.html (July 28, 2006).
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certain to enact patent reform, changing the administrative practices
of the agency responsible for implementing patent law may be the
best opportunity, not only to effect reform, but also to do so in ways
that are data-driven and empirically measurable.
Current administrative structures have been constructed around
certain beliefs, namely that centralized administrators have the best
access to information, that expert bureaucrats are the only way to produce dispassionate decisions, and that making decisions in the public
interest requires keeping the public at bay. This notion of bureaucratic
expertise is premised upon a bygone reality, namely that the agency
possesses the best information. We continue to trust in bureaucratic
expertise that does not work rather than the collective intelligence that
the Internet now makes possible. 25
In the spring of 2007, the USPTO will implement the model of
"Peer-to-Patent" open review as a pilot called Community Patent Review.26 The pilot focuses on integrating an open peer review process
with the USPTO, creating and amalgamating a vetted database of
prior art references to inform examination, and developing deliberation methodologies and technologies that allow community ranking of
the data forwarded to the patent examiner. Community Patent Review
is the first social software project to be directly connected to and have
an impact on the legal decision-making process. Several companies,
representing more than six percent of the total number of new patents,
including Computer Associates, General Electric, IBM, Microsoft,
Hewlett-Packard, and Red Hat, have already agreed to submit their
27
patent applications for examination under this open system. To-

24. While the Supreme Court has heard other patent-related cases this year, the muchanticipated case reviewing the substantive scope of patentability was not decided on the
merits. See Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2976 (2006)
(dismissing writ of certiorari as improvidently granted). Furthermore, the Supreme Court
rarely reviews the Federal Circuit. See Mark D. Janis, Patent law in the Age of the Invisible
Supreme Court, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 387, 387 (2001) ("The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, created in 1982, has become the de facto supreme court of patents."). The 2005
Term was an exception to this practice. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC., 126 S. Ct.
1837 (2006); Illinois Tool Works, Inc., v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1281 (2006); Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1329 (2006) (mem.); KSR Int'! v. Teleflex, 126 S.
Ct. 2965 (2006) (mem.).
25. See Yochai Benkler, Coase 's Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112
YALE L.J. 369 (2002); see also The Digital Universe, http://www.digitaluniverse.net/ (last
visited Oct. 8, 2006) (offering collaborative web portals to foster expertise).
26. USPTO, DRAFT STRATEGIC PLAN 2007-2012 18 (2006), http://www.uspto.gov/
web/offices/com/strat2007/stratplan2007-20 I 2v6.doc [hereinafter DRAFT STRATEGIC
PLAN].
27. See The Peer to Patent Project, http://caims.typepad.com/peertopatent/ (Oct. 24,
2006).
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gether with the Omidyar Network and the MacArthur Foundation,
they will fund this program for the USPT0. 28
We have arrived at a unique moment in history when five factors
converge to make this kind of reform proposal possible: first, the state
of patenting has become so problematic as to meet with almost universal opprobrium; second, the majority of patent applications are
published after eighteen months whether ultimately granted or not, 29
providing the legal foundation for open review; third, expert public
participation in the form of peer review is widely practiced in the public sector and therefore is a familiar model; fourth, we have social
reputation and networking technology that makes open review on this
scale possible; and fifth, we have the necessary expertise with collaborative decision-making systems to be able to design and construct
a new model of administrative practice for the USPTO.
This Article describes the patent system's information deficit
problem and outlines a detailed draft blueprint for the Community
Patent Review pilot. Part II discusses the current state of patent law
and patent examination in the United States and the problems to
which it gives rise. It demonstrates how the information deficit hampers effective patent review.
Part III explains that traditional peer review is not a solution to
the informational deficit because it lacks transparency, has a closed
vision of expertise, and places undue burdens on scientists and agency
officials. As traditionally practiced, it also comes too late in the game
to be useful to remedy the information deficit that impedes quality
decision-making.
Part IV sets out the proposal for open peer review and argues for
opening up patent examination, not to authenticated experts, but to the
collective community. Open review combines the transparency and
self-selection of public participation with the structured practices and
expertise of peer review. Metaphorically, it marries the practices of
30
Wikipedia to the authority of administrative law. This section describes the design features of the Community Patent Review Pilot that
will implement the model.
Part V explains how open review helps to solve the patent quality
problem, is superior to alternative reforms, and benefits the public. It
does so by anticipating objections in a question and answer format.

28. The pilot project is designed and run by the author under the auspices of the New
York Law School Institute for Information Law & Policy. See The Peer to Patent Project,
http://www.dotank.nyls.edu/communitypatent/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2006).
29. Under the current rule, most patent applications are published after eighteen months,
unless the applicant (1) requests otherwise and (2) is not required to publish the application
in a foreign jurisdiction. 35 U.S.C. § 122 (2000). The Patent Reform Act of 2005 would
eliminate this exception. H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 9(a) (2005).
30. See Nicholas Varchaver, Patent Review Goes Wiki, FORTUNE, Aug. 21, 2006, at 18.
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The Article then concludes with a discussion on institutional
competence, claiming that by applying technology to improve the
patent examination process itself, we can bring about legal reform
faster than traditional strategies that view Congress and the courts as
the only institutional mechanisms for change, and in so doing, capture
the benefits of empirical experimentation.
Patent examination urgently needs improvement to remedy the informational deficit that gives rise to low quality patents. Open review
offers the structure through which we can tie public participation to
governmental decision-making in ways that are manageable and useful. At the same time, the empirical lessons to be learned from reforming examination at the USPTO promise to benefit not only intellectual
property law and policy, but administrative practice in general.
II. THE PARADE OF HORRIBLES: INFORMATION DEFICIT AND
PATENT QUALITY

Abraham Lincoln said that the "patent system added the fuel of
interest to the fire of genius." 31 At the founding, it was an inexpensive
way for the new federal government to provide a utilitarian basis to
stimulate innovation. 32 It was also one of the only constitutional
clauses incorporated without debate. 33 Perhaps this was because the
delegates felt, as Mark Twain later expressed it, that "a country without a patent office and good patent laws was just a crab and couldn't
34
travel any way but sideways or backwards."
While patents have provided an incentive for national competitiveness and stimulated investment in new technologies, 35 there is a
general consensus that the crab is traveling backwards: many perceive
the system to be broken. At a minimum, an issued patent must set
forth an invention that is novel, useful, non-obvious, and described
36
with enough specificity to be practiced. Yet of the two million pat37
ents in force in the United States, many do not qualify. The patent

31. Abraham Lincoln, Lecture on Discoveries and Inventions (Feb. 11, 1859), in ABRAHAM LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 1859-1865 3, 11 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed.,
1989).
32. See EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, THE NATURE OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
CLAUSE: A STUDY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 18 {2002).
33.Seeid at 107-10.
34. MARK TWAIN, A CONNECTICUT YANKEE IN KING ARTHUR'S COURT 58 (Signet Classics 2004) (1889).
35. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989) ("From
their inception, the federal patent laws have embodied a careful balance between the need to
promote innovation and the recognition that imitation and refinement through imitation are
both necessary to invention itself and the very lifeblood ofa competitive economy.").
36. See infra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
37. Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495,
1501 (2001).
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awarded to Smucker's for the crustless peanut butter and jelly sandwich is, by now, legendary. 38 Adam Jaffe and Josh Lerner regale the
39
reader in their book Innovation and Its Discontents with many more
horror stories of patents that are anything but "non-obvious" - for
example, a patent awarded to a five-year-old boy for "Method of
40
Swinging on a Swing" and a patent on a method for drafting a patent.41 The "Patently Silly" weblog has dozens more. 42 Even lawyers
are getting into the game, seeking to patent estate planning and other
43
legal techniques that have been practiced in the industry for decades.
An industry has arisen in patent "trolling," where participants
seek patents solely for the purpose of initiating infringement lawsuits
and extorting licensing fees from competitors without producing any
44
product or bringing any innovation to the market. Patent law provides the inventor with a monopoly right to exclude others from us45
ing, selling, making, or practicing the invention, but does not impose
46
a concomitant obligation to do the same. This means, for example,
that the oil industry could patent solar energy inventions that will be
47
put on the shelf and never used. Since "anything under the sun" can
be patentable subject matter and more people are filing patents than
48
ever before, the field is fertile for companies seeking to patent undeserving inventions and to profit from the threat of litigation rather than
49
from productive research and development. Of course, patenting
activity may also reflect productive invention. But a low quality patent over a fundamental research method, if issued, runs the risk of
impeding downstream invention and hampering scientific innovation.
38. U.S. Patent No. 6,004,596 (filed Dec. 8, 1997).
39. JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 2; see also Rochelle Dreyfuss, Pathological Patenting:
The PTO as Cause or Cure, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1559 (2006) (reviewing JAFFE & LERNER,
supra).
40. U.S. Patent No. 6,368,227 (filed Nov. 17, 2000).
41. Machine for Drafting a Patent Application and Process for Doing Same, U.S. Patent
No. 6,574,645 (filed Feb. 19, 2002).
42. Patently Silly, http://www.patentlysilly.com/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2006).
43. See Establishing and Managing Grantor Retained Annuity Trusts Funded by Nonqualified Stock Options, U.S. Patent No. 6,567,790 (filed Dec. l, 1999). At least one author
has advocated against granting patents for legal methods. See Andrew A. Schwartz, The
Patent Office Meets the Poison Pill: Why legal Methods Cannot Be Patented, 20 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. (forthcoming Spring 2007).
44. See Zachary Roth, The Monopoly Factory, WASH.MONTHLY, June 2005, at 12, 18.
45. 35 u.s.c. § 154(d)(l) (2000).
46. See Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429 (1908).
47. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) ("Congress intended statutory
subject matter to 'include anything under the sun that is made by man."') (quoting S. REP.
No. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. No. 82-1923, 6 (1952)).
48. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Who's Patenting What? An Empirical Exploration of Patent Prosecution, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2099, 2099 (2000) ("[l]ndividuals and
companies are obtaining far more patents today than ever before.").
49. See Manny W. Schecter, Open Collaboration is Medicine for Our Ailing Patent System, 72 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 682, 682-85 (2006) (explaining the connection
between low quality patents and the costs of increased litigation from patent trolling).
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The problem is that as old and obvious as an idea might seem,
finding the relevant written information to invalidate it during the review process can be quite difficult, especially under the time and resource constraints created by the backlog and with double the number
50
of applications as there were ten years ago. This creates an opportunity for individuals to exploit the deficiencies in the system.
The USPTO is awarding patents improvidently because of a lack
of access to adequate information and an inability to apply it effectively. Bureaucrats are supposed to possess "the knowledge that
comes from specialized experience."51 Yet the reality is that fifty-five
percent of patent examiners - supposedly expert bureaucrats - have
been employed by the USPTO for fewer than two years, and examin52
ers are not required to possess an advanced degree. They are also
underpaid, earning approximately $55,000 a year while an associate in
53
a Manhattan law firm earns a base salary of $145,000. While not all
patent examiners are lawyers eligible for law firm jobs, the USPTO
still cannot hire quickly enough to keep pace with both the demands
of the job and the attrition rate. 54 Arguably, the USPTO today produces no better results than the registration regime the United States
abandoned in 1836. 55
Patent examiners enjoy a great deal more discretion than their bureaucratic counterparts at other agencies. Patent examiners are responsible for granting a twenty-year monopoly when a first- or second56
year civil servant at another agency would be drafting memoranda.

50. See ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 119 tbl. 2.
51. Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative law, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 1669, 1678 (1975).
52. JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 2, at 135-36.
53. See supra note I 0.
54. There are currently over 4000 patent examiners with plans to increase that number to
7200 in order to address the backlog. See DRAFT STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 26, at 13.
This level of hiring is a critical component of the plans [sic] to address patent pendency regardless of the time frame for such improvements. Notwithstanding these massive hiring efforts, in the
absence of other changes to the current examination system only
modest gains in reducing patent pendency are likely to be achieved in
the near term. In fact, until these new hires are effectively absorbed
into the examination system, average patent pendency will continue
to increase.
Id.
55. See JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 2, at 142; see also Giles S. Rich, laying the Ghost
of the "Invention" Requirement, 14 FED. CIR. B.J. 163, 165 (2004) ("[T]he examination
system as set up under the first patent act proved unworkable and the Act of 1793 was
passed under which we went to a registration system for 43 years. That too was unworkable
and by the Act of 1836 we established the Patent Office ....").
56. See JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 2, at 138 ("[l]nexperienced, underpaid, and overworked patent examiners are making decisions on final administrative actions in a way that
their equally junior counterparts at other agencies are not.").
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The problems that result from examiners' wide-ranging discretion are
57
exacerbated by increasing judicial deference to their decisions.
An understanding of the examination process and how information is retrieved illustrates the effect of the USPTO's inadequate access to relevant scientific resources. Inventors apply for one of three
types of patents: utility, plant, or design. I focus on utility patents for
my description of the review process because they are more numerous, complex, and economically significant. Utility patents are those
that cover "any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
58
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof."
This definition of patentable subject matter is construed broadly to
60
cover "anything under the sun," 59 including business methods, com62
61
puter algorithms, and even living organisms. However, laws of
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable. 63
64
An inventor files an application electronically or by mail to secure a filing date from which the twenty-year period of exclusivity
will begin ifthe patent is granted. 65 This application contains a "specification," illustrations, an oath as to its ownership and truthfulness,
and, of course, the requisite filing fee. 66 The specification includes a
narrative description of the invention with details as to its background
67
and any context necessary to understand its inventive contribution.
The specification must contain a written description of the invention
being claimed. 68 Finally, the specification discloses the metes and
bounds of the invention through the patent's "claims," which are the
69
formalistic statements of the scope of the invention. The application
70
must also set forth the "best mode" for implementing the invention.
There is a well-established information taxonomy by which patents are sorted and organized. The USPTO labels the application with
one of about 450 class and about 150,000 sub-class designations to
57. See James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, lessons for Patent Policy from Empirical
Research On Patent litigation, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. I, 18-19 & n.93 (2005) (discussing an empirical study of patent validity and noting an increasing validity rate since the
creation of the Federal Circuit).
58. 35 U.S.C. § IOI (2000).
59. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
60. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed
Cir. 1998).
61. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185-87 (1981)
62. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309.
63. MPEP, supra note 4, § 2105.
64. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.8, 1.52 (2006).
65. 35 U.S.C. § I 54(a)(2) (2000).
66. Id. § l l l(a)(3).
67. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.71.
68. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
69. Id.
70. Id. The best mode requirement ensures that the public learns the best way to use the
invention. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Lab. Inc., 251F.3d955, 963 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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enable indexing, sorting, and retrieval of the relevant application and
71
materials.
In the course of the ensuing patent review, known as patent
prosecution, the examiner may correspond with the inventor in a series of colloquies known as "office actions," whereby the examiner
72
rejects and the applicant amends the pending application. The inventor can amend the application during prosecution in an effort to narrow the claims until they are allowable. 73 Even if the examiner
eventually rejects the application, an inventor may respond by filing a
75
continuation74 or amendment or by filing an appeal with the Board
76
of Patent Appeals and Interferences. Prosecution ends when the patent is either granted or the application is abandoned.
The examiner reviews an application under five major statutory
· ·
. 18 nove lty, 19 noncntena:
patentabl e su b'~ect matter, 11 ut1•11ty,
81
obviousness,80 and enablement. The subject matter requirement
screens erroneously filed applications as well as applications directed
to an idea, conception, law of nature, or similarly abstract phenomenon. 82 The utility requirement dictates that patents issue for operable
and functioning inventions and that these inventions serve a public
84
83
purpose. Patents are seldom rejected for lack ofutility.
The core of the examination centers around two inquiries: novelty
85
and non-obviousness. Novelty asks whether the invention is new.
Non-obviousness asks whether the invention is more than an obvious
advance over what came before from the perspective of one with ordinary skill in the field of the invention. 86
To decide the question of novelty, the examiner asks whether the
claimed invention differs from previous inventions. This requires a
71. See USPTO, Classification Help File, http://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/
classification/help.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2006).
72. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.104 (2006).
73. Id.§ l.l l l(c)(2006).
74. See id § 1.114 (2006).
75. See id. § 1.116 (2006).
76. See 35 U.S.C. § 134 (2000).
77. See id§ IOI (2000) (allowing grant ofa patent for "any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof').
78. See Brennerv. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 528-29 (1966); see also 35 U.S.C. §§IOI, 112
(2000).
79. 35 u.s.c. § 102 (2000).
80. /d § 103.
81. See id. § 112.
82. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981 ).
83. See Brenner, 383 U.S. at 534-35.
84. The utility requirement is generally a more significant hurdle for pharmaceutical
products and biotechnology than for mechanical inventions. I DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM
ON PATENTS§ 4.01 (2006) (citing In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
85. See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 190.
86. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000).
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search for the "prior art" - the potentially pre-empting knowledge
that existed at the time of the invention. Prior art is not limited to patents or patent applications. It can include published materials, such as
journal articles, websites, or other disclosures, that might suggest that
the invention is not new. 87
The examiner's options for searching the prior art are limited.
Patent examiners, especially those who are unable to use the Internet,
must rely on three computer systems in place at the USPTO: Examiner's Automated Search Tool ("EAST"), Web-Based Examiner
Search Tool ("WEST"), and Foreign Patent Access System
("FPAS"). 88 These databases provide access to prior U.S. patents, foreign patent abstracts, certain pending U.S. applications, and additional
proprietary database libraries. 89 The US PTO databases are not exhaustive. While an examiner might be inclined to use Google to look up
information online, the use of Internet research is restricted for security reasons, as there is a risk that examiner searching could be
tracked. 90 In effect, the examiner is limited to internal sources available at the office.
Empirical data confirms the inadequacy of USPTO search capabilities. In a recent study of 502,687 utility patents, examiners were
found to have a disadvantage in searching for non-patent prior art or
foreign patents.91 Interestingly, while patent examiners accounted for
forty-one percent of the citations to previous U.S. patents, they accounted for only ten percent of references to non-patent prior art. 92
The study concludes that this gap is due to inferior search capabilities
for prior art other than U.S. Patents. 93
Examiners are not independently finding what they need, and applicants are not required to provide it. 94 Furthermore, third parties are

87. See I CHISUM, supra note 84, § 3.04.
88. MPEP, supra note 4, § 902.03(e).
89. See id.
90. See MPEP, supra note 4, § 904.02(c) ("This policy also applies to use of the Internet
as a communications medium for connecting to commercial database providers."); Internet
Usage Policy, 63 Fed. Reg. 57,101, 57,103 (Oct. 26, 1998) ("If security and confidentiality
cannot be attained for a specific use, transaction, or activity, then that specific use, transaction, or activity shall NOT be undertaken/conducted.").
91. Shaven N. Sampat, Determinants of Patent Quality: An Empirical Analysis, 2-3
(Sept. 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://siepr.stanford.edu/programs/
SST_ Seminars/patentquality_ new.pdf_ 1.pdf.
92. Id. at 8.
93.Seeid. at 13.
94. An applicant is required to disclose any information that is material to the prosecution
of the patent. 37 C.F.R. § l.63(b)(3) (2006). "[A]n applicant and his or her patent attorney
[traditionally) were under no duty to conduct a search of the prior art." 6 CHISUM, supra
note 84, § J 9.03(2)(b)(i). Sometimes applicants file no prior art at all. See, e.g., Patent
Chronicles, http://www.patentchronicles.com/ (Mar. 23, 2005, 15:30 EST). The USPTO has
proposed a rule change to "encourage patent applicants to provide the USPTO the most
relevant information related to their inventions in the early stages of the review process."
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not reliable sources of information. In part, this is because Congress
directed that the USPTO structure its procedures to prevent "protest
or ... pre-issuance opposition."95 Hence, independent third-party input is greatly restricted; it must be made by mail, within a two-month
96
window, for a fee of $180, and without commentary. Not surprisingly, third-party input is rarely given. There were between forty and
one hundred third party comments filed in 2005. 97 In sum, "the informational burdens on the examiner are clearly heavy - even before
the examiner engages in the heavy lifting of interpreting the prior
art."98
99
This gives rise to a "Goldilocks problem": too little information,
too much information, and none of it just right. In searching for prior
art - such as other patents or journal articles, websites, or other disclosures that might suggest that the invention is not new - the examiner sometimes finds nothing. While the patent may seem familiar to
an examiner, often she cannot find other written material that actually
teaches the claims of the patent. This is particularly the case in cutting-edge areas of innovation, such as business methods, where there
is not a large pool of patents from which relevant prior art may be
00
drawn. ' Alternatively, the examiner is so inundated with related
prior art, such as in the biotechnology field, that she has trouble reviewing the application, winnowing the material, and finding art that
is relevant and useful for the examination process in the time allotted.101
It is not enough to ensure that the invention is new. The crux of
the patentability determination is whether the invention represents a
Changes To Information Disclosure Statement Requirements and Other Related Matters, 71
Fed. Reg. 38,808 (July I 0, 2006).
95. 35 U.S.C.S. § I 22(c) (2006).
96. See MPEP, supra note 4, § 1134.01; 37 C.F.R. § 1.99 (2006). The patent examiner
may not respond to the third party, except to process the fee. Robert Clarke, Deputy Director, Office of Patent Legal Administration, Presentation at Meeting of the US PTO (Feb. 16,
2006), http://cairns.typepad.com/peertopatent/files/community_patent_and_pto2 l 3v2.ppt.
97. Robert Clarke, Deputy Director, Office of Patent Legal Administration, Remarks at
Meeting of the Community Patent Review Steering Committee (Sept. 11, 2006).
98. Petherbridge, supra note 5, at 183.
99. See Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and Sticks to Create a Better Patent System, 17 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 763, 763 (2002) ("It is widely recognized that the Patent Office grants overlybroad patents because it has deficient knowledge of the relevant prior art, especially in high
technology areas with significant nonpatent prior art.").
I 00. After the Federal Circuit made clear in 1998 that business methods were patentable
subject matter, see State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149
F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), the number of applications for business method patents rose
dramatically. See John R. Allison & Starling D. Hunter, On the Feasibility of Improving
Patent Quality One Technology at a Time: The Case of Business Methods, 21 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 729, 730-31 (2006). Patent examiners have had difficulty finding "written references stating common knowledge" in this emerging field. See Arti K. Rai, Allocating Power
over Fact-Finding in the Patent System, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 907, 914 (2004).
IOI. See Eli Kintisch, US Patent Policy: PTO Wants to Tap Experts to Help Examiners,
312 SCIENCE 982, 982 (2006).

No. l]

Peer to Patent

137

significant enough advance over what came before. This decision is
made from the perspective of the relevant expert, the "person having
ordinary skill in the art to which [the] subject matter pertains." 102 As
patent scholar Rebecca Eisenberg explains:
[T]his language seems to call for evaluations of nonobviousness from the perspective of ordinary practitioners who are contemporaries of the inventor in the
relevant technological community. It specifies a
point in time as to which the obviousness of the invention should be evaluated ("at the time the invention was made") and designates the person whose
judgment of obviousness should control ("to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains" or PHOSIT A), as well as
directing attention to "the differences between the
subject matter sought to be patented and the prior
art."103
The examiner's manual suggests three bases for assessing obviousness. First, there must be "some suggestion or motivation" available to one having ordinary skill in the art "to modify the reference or
to combine reference teachings." Second, "there must be a reasonable
expectation" that the invention will succeed. Finally, the prior art references, whether alone or in combination, "must teach or suggest all
104
the claim limitations."
Essential to this determination is that the examiner put herself in
the shoes of the fictional person skilled in the art and render a determination through his eyes and not her own. This requires identifying
105
the person and what characterizes his skill set. The person skilled in
the art is considered to be the best metric for the scope, content, and
meaning of prior references.
Assessing the relevant information through the eyes of this fictional legal expert is an added burden on the examiner. The difficulty
I 02. 35 U.S.C. § I 03(a) (2000).
103. Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 886 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000)).
I 04. MPEP, supra note 4, § 706.020).
105. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. I, 17-18 (1966).
Under § I 03, the scope and content of the prior art are to be determined; differences between the prior art and the claims at issue are to
be ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved. Against this background, the obviousness or nonobviousness
of the subject matter is determined. Such secondary considerations as
commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others,
etc., might be utilized to give light to the circumstances surrounding
the origin of the subject matter sought to be patented. As indicia of
obviousness or nonobviousness, these inquiries may have relevancy.

Id.
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of this task is illustrated by the fact that courts have largely given up
on applying the standard:
Today, PHOSITA sits on the sidelines of obviousness analysis. Courts consult PHOSIT A on the
scope, content and meaning of prior art references
but not on the ultimate question of whether the invention would have been obvious at the time it was
made in light of the prior art. The resulting analysis
excludes from consideration the judgment, intuition
and tacit knowledge of ordinary practitioners in the
field that cannot be documented in the written record.106
In sum, to prevent the corruption of the examiner and unfairness
to the applicant, USPTO procedures prescribe an insular process for
patent application review. Examiners must rely on internal databases
and are not permitted to consult outside sources. While the public may
submit limited prior art, they may not submit any commentary or
analysis after publication and before the grant of the patent application. The resulting information deficit inevitably results in patents
issued without the benefit of the appropriate prior art or the perspective that could be brought to bear by expert inquiry. A solution to the
problems that plague the examination process ought to help the examiner find the best information while allowing her to maintain her role
as the ultimate legal arbiter ofpatentability.

Ill. WHY TRADITIONAL PEER REVIEW IS NOT THE SOLUTION
Peer review is the traditional solution proposed for the information deficit and information quality problems of administrative agencies.107 I pause to consider, therefore, whether traditional peer review
panels would solve these problems for the patent examination process.
This Part concludes that because of a lack of transparency, traditional
peer review is inappropriate in this context.

I 06. Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 888.
107. See SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFfH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISORS AS POLICY MAKERS 61-84 ( 1990); OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, JOSHUA B. BOLTEN, ISSUANCE OMB 'S
FINAL INFORMATION QUALITY BULLETIN FOR PEER REVIEW, OMB Memorandum M-05-03
(Dec. 16, 2004 ).
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Peer review is commonly used in govemment, 108 and is often a
key part of the process of awarding research grants. 109 The National
Science Foundation currently relies on a network of over 50,000 reviewers.110 The National Institutes of Health relies on outside review
groups and advisory councils from the scientific community to review
111
about seventy percent of its grant applications. The Environmental
Protection Agency grant selection process "relies heavily upon ...
Science Review Panels," which are peer review groups chosen and
. . 112
manage db y an outst'de sc1ent1st.
Refereeing procedures have come to be regarded as
the most effective method of validating science in
two quite different spheres of professional activity:
prepublication review of journal articles and screening of applications by federal research-sponsoring
agencies. There is thus an appealing logic to the syllogism that links peer review to "good science" in
113
the regulatory process.
Peer review is also used to evaluate policy data and provide a
mechanism for oversight of agency science. Congress has tried to improve the quality of information that agencies use and disseminate in
other settings by increasing the use of peer review under the Informa114
tion Quality Act ("IQA").
Under the Office of Management and
I 08. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FEDERAL RESEARCH: PEER REVIEW
PRACTICES AT FEDERAL SCIENCE AGENCIES VARY, GAO/RCED-99-99 (1999); U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PEER REVIEW: EPA NEEDS IMPLEMENTATION PROCEDURES AND
ADDITIONAL CONTROLS, GAO/IRCED-94-98 (1994); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
PEER REVIEW: REFORMS NEEDED TO ENSURE FAIRNESS IN FEDERAL AGENCY GRANT SELECTION, GAO/PEMD-94-1 (1994); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PEER REVIEW: COMPLIANCE WITH THE PRIVACY ACT AND FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ACT, GAO/GGD91-48 (1991); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEES: GSA'S
MANAGEMENT OVERSIGHT AND GAO COMMENTS ON PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENTS, GAOff-GGD-89-1 (1988); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FEDERAL ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ACT: GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION'S MANAGEMENT OF ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ACTIVITIES, GA0/GGD89-10 (1988); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, UNIVERSITY FUNDING: INFORMATION ON THE ROLE OF PEER REVIEW AT NSF AND NIH,
GAO/WED-87-87FS (1987); see also Lars Noah, Scientific "Republicanism": Expert Peer
Review and the Quest for Regulatory Deliberation, 49 EMORY L.J. 1033, 1047 (2000) (discussing various ways peer review is used in government).
I 09. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FEDERAL RESEARCH: PEER REVIEW PRACTICES AT FEDERAL SCIENCE AGENCIES VARY, supra note 108, at 2.
110. See Nat'I Sci. Found., How We Work, http://www.nsf.gov/about/how.jsp (last visited Oct. 20, 2006); see also Thomas 0. McGarity, Peer Review in Awarding Federal
Grants in the Arts and Sciences, 9 HIGH TECH. L.J. I, 15 (1994).
111. Nat'! Insts. of Health, About the Center for Scientific Review,
http://cms.csr.nih.gov/AboutCSR/Welcome+to+CSR (last visited Oct. 20, 2006).
112. McGarity, supra note 110, at 27.
113. JASANOFF,supra note 107, at 61.
114. See Lisa Heinzerling, Risking It All, 57 ALA. L. REV. 103, 111 (2005) (describing
the IQA as "a one paragraph measure slipped into an appropriations bill without debate");
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Budget ("OMB") Agency Information Quality Guidelines, independent peer review of data creates a presumption that the data is of suffi115
In its Final Information
cient objectivity to be disseminated.
Quality Bulletin for Peer Review, OMB mandates that agencies employ peer review. The Bulletin sets forth detailed requirements for
peer review that focused on "timing of peer reviews, selection of reviewers, transparency of review, and opportunities for public participation."116
This predilection for peer review is not surprising since both
agencies and the scientific community have longstanding experience
117
with peer review practices.
Such regularized review processes are
well-suited to the workings of administrative agencies:
[T]he postwar intellectual and political project in
policymaking became the reconciliation of the practical necessity of broad administrative discretion
with this emerging pluralist norm. The "solution"
was found in the idea of administrative process.
Henceforth, public administrators would become
managers of neutral processes designed to discover
"optimal" public policies. The hallmark of the administrator became procedural expertise in using a
set of techniques applicable to all sorts of public
problems rather than substantive expertise in solving
particular kinds. 118
At first glance, traditional peer review appears to be a fairly conservative means to attack the information quality problem and seems to
provide much needed oversight and accountability.
Unfortunately, peer review is fraught with problems that undermine its credibility. 119 This has prompted several leading scientific
see also Act of Dec. 21, 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554 app. C, § 515, 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A153 to 154 (2000) (codified at 44 U.S.C. § 3516 note (2000)).
115. See Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Information Quality Guidelines, 67 Fed. Reg. 8452,
8459 (Feb. 22, 2002).
116. Stephen Johnson, Reforming the Information Quality Act, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 60
(2005); see also Final Information Quality Bulletin for Peer Review, 70 Fed. Reg. 2664,
2665 (Jan. 14, 2005).
117. See Mohammed Kashef, Scientific Peer Review in the Public Sector 1 (Dec. 5,
2005), http://dotank.nyls.edu/communitypatent/peerreview_dec05.pdf ("[Peer review] is an
integral practice to the development of quality research in the private and public sectors, in
industry and in education because the process of peer review allows even a large group of
scientists, regardless of geographic proximity, to collaborate on the evaluation of innovation.").
118. Robert B. Reich, Public Administration and Public Deliberation: An Interpretive
Essay, 94 YALE L.J. 1617, 1619 (1985).
119. See JASANOFF, supra note 107, at 69-76; Wendy E. Wagner, The "Bad Science"
Fiction: Reclaiming the Debate over the Role of Science in Public Health and Environ-
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organizations to attack existing governmental peer review frameworks.120 These problems stem from the fact that it is an elite, closed
process and therefore subject to manipulation. Though the process is
not secretive, 121 it is closed in the sense that agency peer review
groups are empanelled, not self-selected. As a result, only certain
kinds of industry and academic experts will typically be invited. It is
therefore possible to stack the deck with ideologues, creating peer
review mechanisms that are characterized not by deliberative disagreement but by unproductive conflict. The selection criteria need
not be based on politics - though a political litmus test is frequently
imposed 122 - but they may be based on educational or social status,
thereby shutting out otherwise qualified and meaningful contributors.
Because there is no single definition of peer review, 123 the mere
fact that an agency employs a process by the name of "peer review"
does not ensure transparency or quality. There are no assurances that
mental Regulation, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 67-71. (2003); Sidney A. Shapiro,
Politicizing Peer Review: The legal Perspective, in RESCUING SCIENCE FROM POLITICS
238-254 (Wendy Wagner & Rena Steinzor eds., 2006).
120. See OMB Watch, Peer Review News, http://www.ombwatch.org/article/archive/232
(last visited Oct. I 0, 2006) (archiving objections to OMB peer review guidelines); see also
DefendingScience.org, OMB's Peer Review Guidelines, http://www.defendingscience.org/
public_health_regulations/peer_review_guidelines.cfm (last visited Sept. 24, 2006); Chris
Mooney, Committee for the Scientific Investigation of Claims of the Paranormal, The Politics of Peer Review, Jan. 8, 2004, http://www.csicop.org/doubtandabout/peerreview/
("(Y)ou might expect that a recent White House Office of Management and Budget proposal to expand the use of peer review in the evaluation of scientific research conducted by
federal agencies would find a warm welcome from scientists. You'd be dead wrong. Scientific heavyweights like the American Public Health Association, the Association of American Medical Colleges, and the Federation of American Societies for Experimental Biology
have issued scathing critiques of the proposal (the latter two jointly), as have a range of
other organizations and experts. The hallowed American Association for the Advancement
of Science - which publishes the preeminent peer reviewed journal Science - also has
worries about the idea. A group of Democratic members of Congress even dubbed it a 'wolf
in sheep's clothing."').
121. The Federal Advisory Committee Act ensures that advice rendered by advisory
committees is open and accessible. 5 U.S.C. app § 2 (2000).
122. To serve on the NIH Drug Abuse panel, candidates were asked if they had voted for
President Bush. See William R. Miller, Litmus Test for Appointees at the National Institute
(2004),
http://www.ucsusa.org/scientific_integrity/interference/
on
Drug
Abuse
nih-drug-abuse-panel.html. This is not the only recent example of political pressures coming
to bear on scientific policymaking. See Union of Concerned Scientists, Political Litmus
Tests at the Fogarty International Center, http://www.ucsusa.org/scientific_integrity/
interference/fogarty-international-center-advisory-board.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2006)
("(M]ore scientists have disclosed their personal experiences with political litmus tests
applied by the Bush administration in the appointment process for a wide range of scientific
advisory positions."); Union of Concerned Scientists, Scientific Integrity in Policy Making:
An Investigation into the Bush Administration's Abuse of Science, http://www.ucsusa.org/
scienti fie_ integrity/interference/reports-scienti fic-i ntegri ty-in-po Iicy-making. htm I
(last visited Nov. 17, 2006) (describing general patterns of political influence on the process
of scientific policy making).
123. See J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, In Defense of Regulatory Peer Review, 84 WASH.
U. L. REV. I, 14 (2006) (arguing that the right type of peer review can play a role in appropriate circumstances).
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what they do is based on good science rather than political prejudice.
The Government Accountability Office ("GAO") has found, for example, that "further improvements are needed to expand the scope of
peer reviews [at the EPA] and make them more independent," and
that the implementation of the EPA's peer review policy has been
"uneven." 124
125
126
Peer review is also time-consuming to organize and run. Because the group has to be selected, vetted, and approved, disputes can
arise over membership. Conflicts of interest have to be identified and
sorted out. Participants have to be convinced to join. Not only does
the composition of the group need to be defended, but the convenor
may have to defend the scope of work. Hence, setting up peer review
panels requires setting boundaries and, subsequently, policing and
defending those boundaries.
It is, perhaps, in part because of the work required to maintain a
peer review system that review generally happens late in the process - too late to have a significant impact on regulatory decisionmaking. Agencies ask for public comment once a rule is already written, often allotting the public only a short window in which to provide
127
feedback and leaving little room for meaningful change.
The closed process fits well, however, with the culture and practice of agencies. "By deferring to expertise and asserting it ourselves,
we help create a world organized around the pretense that some people, armed and limited by their special knowledge, can be trusted to
be in charge," writes Professor Gerald Frug. 128 Closed peer review
124. Raul & Dwyer, supra note 18, at 13; see also id. at 7 n.24 ("[The] GAO has identified several weaknesses in EPA's science programs over the years, including (1) the uneven
implementation of peer review procedures for EPA's scientific and technical products, (2)
gaps in scientific data, and (3) the lack of performance goals and measures that show the
environmental results of EPA's science activities.") (quoting U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE AND RESULTS ACT: INFORMATION ON SCIENCE ISSUES
IN EPA 'S PERFORMANCE REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1999 AND PERFORMANCE PLANS FOR
FISCAL YEARS 2000 AND 2001, No. 00-270 (2000)).
125. See Sidney Shapiro, Data Quality: The Data Quality Appropriations Rider: New
Procedures
and
Information
Disclosure,
Center
for
Progressive
Reform,
http://www.progressiveregulation.org/perspectives/dataQuality.cfm (last visited Aug. 14,
2006) ("(P]rocedural requirements have an important side effect - they slow down the
government's capacity to act and, if they are sufficiently burdensome, they can bring government to a standstill. As a result, the benefits of imposing additional procedures have to be
balanced against the consequences to the public of delaying agency action.").
126. See Megan Sever, Government Peer Review, GEOTIMES (Nov. 2003),
http://www.agiweb.org/geotimes/nov03/NN_peerrev.html ("Opponents, however, warn that
the [peer review] standards could paralyze new regulations, especially on issues such as
global warming, or air or water pollution, where the risks and benefits are complex, politically charged and potentially costly.").
127. The Administrative Procedure Act provides for a minimum window of 30 days of
public consultation. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c), (d) (2006).
128. Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American law, 97 HARV. L. REV.
1276, 1333 (1984) (emphasis omitted). Frug goes on to point out, quoting the moral philosopher Alasdair Macintyre, that '"Bureaucratic Man' can thrive only if all of us invent a
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arguably supports this self-proclaimed expertise by lending credibility
to the agency's assertion of expert knowledge.

IV. "PEER TO PATENT": THE OPEN REVIEW ALTERNATIVE
Institutional processes are needed to overcome the problems of
closed peer review and create more transparent mechanisms that bring
scientific expertise to bear earlier in the patent review process. Doing
so should not be overly time-consuming and burdensome for the patent examiner or for long-suffering inventors who are already waiting
years in line at the USPTO.
In other domains, the combination of open technology and welldefined process has successfully enabled a distributed group to share
expertise. Open self-selection, rather than closed peer review, makes
it possible for Wikipedia to harness public knowledge and create an
encyclopedia with over one million entries 129 of quality comparable to
130
that of traditional, centrally edited encyclopedias. New technology
has enabled Amazon to create a marketplace, not just for the sale of
goods and services, but also for the aggregation of expertise and recommendations about those goods and services. 131 CNET offers a platform to share expertise about electronics and technology. 132 The
Internet Movie Database, the largest repository of information about
cinema, draws much of its content from volunteers submitting data
about films and movie stars. 133 The Public Library of Science, the
pioneering open access publisher of scientific journals, is launching
PLoS ONE, a distributed knowledge network to enable scholars of
biology and medicine to discuss published research literature. 134

fiction of expertise that assigns to the character of the 'broad-gauged' leader a role that
justifies our own powerlessness." Id.
129. See Wikipedia, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia (as of Nov. 20,
2006, 06:40 GMT) (stating that, as of this writing, there are over 1,400,000 entries).
130. See Jim Giles, Internet Encyclopaedias Go Head to Head, 438 NATURE 900 (2005)
(discussing a Nature study demonstrating that Wikipedia is about as accurate as Encyclopedia Britannica).
131. See Shay David & Trevor Pinch, Six Degrees of Reputation: The Use and Abuse of
Online Review and Recommendation Systems, FIRST MONDAY, March 2006,
http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue 11 _3/david/index _original.html (describing strategies and techniques of user reviews and recommendations on Amazon).
132. See CNET.com, http://www.cnet.com/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2006).
133. See IMDb, The Internet Movie Database, http://www.imdb.com/ (last visited Oct.
11, 2006); Wikipedia, Internet Movie Database, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IMDB (as of
Sept. 24, 2006 00:36 GMT) ("The IMDb website consists of the largest known single accumulation of data on individual films .... Information is largely provided by a cadre of
volunteer contributors, with only 17 members of the staff dedicated to monitoring the data
received.").
134. Public Library of Science, Public Library of Science Announces PLoS ONE: A New
Approach to Open-Access Publishing (June 7, 2006), http://www.plos.org/
news/announce_plosone.html.
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These experiments with online collaboration have shown that often "ordinary" people possess extraordinary knowledge that they are
135
willing to share when it is easy to do so. Making participation open
and subject to self-selection can leverage not only the "wisdom of the
136
crowd"
but also its enthusiasm. Experience with the tools now
available is undermining traditional assumptions about how expertise
must be organized and pointing the way toward the use of open models of scientific review to inform legal decision-making.
Patent examination is well-suited to pre-grant community participation because it depends on scientific expertise to make the correct
determination. Just as a community of open source programmers can
137
better spot mistakes in code than one individual can, the applicable
scientific and innovation community is better equipped to address the
science found in patent applications. An examiner with access to limited information should not bear the sole responsibility of determining
originality or obviousness when it is possible to harness the collective
intelligence and experience of thousands. It is also illogical to tum to
private firms to conduct this review, as the USPTO once suggested, 138
because this simply replaces one closed group with another, and may
still exclude those with the greatest expertise in a given area.
Moreover, an open process for patent examination can encourage
self-selection by those who are best equipped to contribute. 139 While a
patent examiner might fruitlessly search for prior art for hours, if the
process is open and publicly accessible, the appropriate expert is
likely to know instantly whether an invention is reminiscent of earlier
work or avenues of research. Expert public participation can provide
the right information to the USPTO or otherwise guide the examiner's
research.
Technology is revolutionizing the capacity for purposive collective action: together we can accomplish what we cannot do alone. 140
135. See Yochai Benkler, Freedom in the Commons: Towards a Political Economy of Information, 52 DUKE L.J. 1245, 1256-57 (2003) (stating that peer production is the collaborative process by which individuals "contribute to a joint effort" to produce "information or
culture"); Benkler, supra note 25.
136. See JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS (2004) (demonstrating how
groups of people can be smarter and more effective than individuals at certain kinds of
decisions).
137. As Eric Raymond says, "given enough eyeballs, all [software] bugs are shallow."
Eric S. Raymond, The Cathedral and the Bazaar (Sept. 11, 2000), http://catb.org/--esr/
writings/cathedral-bazaar/cathedral-bazaar/index.html.
138. See
USPTO,
THE 21ST CENTURY STRATEGIC PLAN
10 (2003),
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/strat2 l/stratplan_03feb2003.pdf (proposing that the
USPTO investigate market-driven initiatives to "achieve greater examiner productivity by
reducing their prior art search responsibilities").
139. Cf STEVEN WEBER, THE SUCCESS OF OPEN SOURCE 62 (2004) (describing the advantages of "voluntary participation and voluntary selection of tasks" in open source development) (emphasis omitted).
140.See Beth Simone Noveck, A Democracy of Groups, FIRST MONDAY, Nov. 2005,
http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue I 0_11 /noveck/.
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The goal is to engineer the practices and the systems for an open collaborative information-gathering process to bring together the work of
the scientist and the legal expert. Hopefully, this will improve governmental decision-making. At the same time, such a process makes it
possible for citizens to engage in deliberating around questions of
public importance and to participate in the important decisions of our
democracy, including the future of patent monopolies.
The forthcoming USPTO Community Patent Review pilot,
adopted based on an earlier draft of this article, will begin in April
2007. With inventor consent, between 250 and 400 software-related
patents will be submitted for open patent examination. Open review
will supplement, not replace, substantive examination by a USPTO
examiner. The process will augment the current rules that permit
third-party submission of comments for a fee and in writing. For the
first time, third parties will be able to submit prior art with commentary online. To encourage participation, the USPTO will waive the fee
for third party submissions. The USPTO will offer the added incentive
of jumping consenting applicants to the front of the queue for expe141
dited review.
The design of the pilot puts the idea of open review into practice
by means of unique technology and legal process. This design is
based upon normative democratic principles. The pilot should foster
participatory practices that enable citizen engagement and governmental accountability to a wider public. The process should be open,
using not only open source software but also practices that are fully
transparent. To that end, the pilot must maintain the same level of
legitimacy and incorruptibility that characterizes traditional examination. Public involvement cannot come at the expense of corruption or
undue influence. The pilot will be open to all those who want to participate constructively. The attempt is to create institutional mechanisms, not for any and all participation, but for informed, thoughtful
participation that improves patent examination. Moderation, for this
reason, is entirely appropriate. Ultimately, this pilot will demand, as
the expression goes, "rough consensus and running code" 142 - a willingness to experiment and iterate by responding to feedback and improving this new institution so that it serves its intended purposes
while respecting core constitutional democratic values.
The pilot has one goal: to ensure that the knowledgeable public
can submit prior art relevant to the patent application's claims to the
USPTO for consideration.
141. For additional details, see generally Beth Simone Noveck, Community
Patent
Review
Project
Summary,
http://dotank.nyls.edu/communitypatent/
p2p_exec _sum_sep_ 06.pdf.
142. Cf Paul Hoffman & Susan Harris, The Tao oflETF: A Novice's Guide to the Internet Engineering Task Force, http://www.ietf.org/tao.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2006) (describing phrase as a "founding belief' of the IETF).
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Under the terms of the program, patent applicants may request review of their patent application under the Community Patent Review
process. Once an applicant makes the request and files a consent with
the USPTO, a copy of their patent application will be transferred to
the Peer-to-Patent software system for a period of review. Each application will reside on a webpage where users can submit relevant prior
art for two months. The two-month window tracks the amount of time
currently available to members of the public wishing to submit written
143
Limiting the time for submission will
prior art under Rule 1.99.
ensure that excessive volume does not overload the patent examiner
or delay substantive patent examination. It may also create an impetus
to participate by offering enough time for thoughtful work without
inducing delay. On the basis of experimentation, the window for input
may be increased to four or more months.
To ensure that those with the necessary know-how can navigate
to the right patent application, the design of the software system must
be optimized to ensure participation. Potential contributors can search
applications, share them with colleagues, and subscribe to receive
notifications and updates. Visualization aids will help contributors
track the level and contentiousness of activity around a particular patent application. These aids may not only help to make information
about the patent application visible to participants, but also make help
the community involved in submitting prior art more self-aware. To
suggest patents to review, the system might employ a collaborative
filtering system akin to Amazon's - prompting users with statements
such as "People who submitted prior art for this patent also read Patent X."
In addition, reviewers can "tag" or label applications with their
own designations. While patents are officially classified by the
USPTO, this kind of supplementary community self-tagging, called a
144
"folksonomy," might make it easier to find applications of interest
by allowing experts to apply other labels to identify an invention in
the terminology that is common to his or her specialty. For example, a
145
member of what the USPTO calls Class 482 Exercise Devices
might commonly be known among physical therapists as an "elliptical
machine." A reviewer might label a device classified under Class 438
Semiconductor Device Manufacturing as a "chip." By making label-

143. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
144. See Wikipedia, Fo/ksonomy, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Folksonomy (as of Sept.
27, 2006, 23:36 GMT); see also Clay Shirky, Ontology is Overrated: Categories, Links, and
Tags, http://www.shirky.com/writings/ontology_overrated.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2006).
145. The Patent Classification System can be found online, arranged alphabetically, by
subject matter, by class number, and by art unit. See Office of Patent Classification,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/opc/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2006).
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ing more granular and precise, such a folksonomy could help contributors self-assign to areas of interest. 146
To ensure that contributors can submit prior art in ways that make
participation easy for the contributor but manageable to read for the
patent examiner, the system will offer a variety of participation options, some of which will demand more commitment than others.
These include rating patent claims, submitting examples of prior art,
commenting on prior art submissions, ranking prior art submissions,
and rating other contributors.
In order not to wind up the machinery of peer review where it is
not needed, the system must channel the expertise of the community
where it is most useful. Because current law does not permit the examiner to communicate with the public to indicate which claims are
the most important, the software will allow the community to provide
this direction. Users can vote on the most critical claims where research should be focused. For instance, an application might recite a
method for sending and receiving electronic signals by means of a
special hash algorithm. The examiner does not need prior art pertaining to sending and receiving, which are common steps. Rather, the
community's attention should be directed to finding prior art pertaining to the hash algorithm.
Contributors will collaborate to submit and annotate prior art to
assist the examiner with the patent application review process. This
will require the contributor to identify the claims to which a piece of
prior art pertains, whether it predates the invention at issue, and the
reasons the submitter believes the prior art relates to the conditions for
patentability. Unlike the current paper-based system, in the pilot, the
contributor must provide this commentary along with the submission
to demonstrate relevance. For a pilot, applicants can consent to receive commentary. Eventually, the law might be changed to permit
third-party comment on pre-grant submissions. Contributors can collaborate online to provide that commentary in order to understand
thoroughly the relevance of a submission to a given claim.
Directions, instruction, and even moderation will be essential to
educate the community about useful and appropriate submissions. The
software can do some of the "heavy lifting" to ensure that submissions
are provided in the appropriate form. For example, if the date of the
prior art submission does not predate the invention, it will automatically be rejected. If the date is falsified or mistyped, however, a human moderator can reject a submission before it is posted publicly
online. Members of the participating peer review community will be
146. User created taxonomy and classification systems have been proposed in other disciplines. See Andrew Polaszek, Commentary, A Universal Register for Animal Names, 437
NATURE 477 (2005). Existing websites have already implemented similar technology. See,
e.g., del.icio.us About Page, http://del.icio.us/doc/about (last visited Sept. 28, 2006).
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able to improve the quality of information by annotating a prior art
submission, providing additional bibliographic information, direction,
and commentary.
A prior art submission must contain enough bibliographic and
substantive information to allow other contributors to view and comment on it, such as a patent number or a URL. Where information is
available only in hard copy, relevant portions might be excerpted and
posted online, or the entire document might be scanned in and made
available. In all cases, a complete copy must be transmitted to the
USPTO for consideration as part of the legal record.
The information shared as part of the public review process must
comply with the relevant laws, including copyright law. Where contributors are sharing patents or other public domain material as prior
art, there are no copyright concerns But when a contributor wishes to
upload a copy of a copyrighted journal or magazine article, computer
code, or other information, this could give rise to liability for copyright infringement for the contributor as well as secondary liability for
those administering the Community Patent Review project. When the
desired information is freely available online, problems can be averted
by linking to third party websites. The Peer-to-Patent system will require the inclusion of a URL. Where information is in hard copy or
otherwise not freely available online (for example, a passwordprotected journal website), an excerpt or quote can be shared publicly
under the doctrine of fair use. 147 In this case, I would argue that it is
fair use even if a user uploads and the software transmits a single copy
of the information privately to the USPTO so long as it is not made
accessible or visible to the public. It might also be fair use to display a
single locked-down copy on the website along with a notice and takedown policy to offer copyright holders some recourse. 148 This may
not, however, completely protect the contributor who scanned and
uploaded a copyrighted document for this purpose. Thus, while it will
be preferable to rely on the use of licensed and public domain works,
the project might also necessitate testing the boundaries of fair use,
though, arguably, with very low risk. It may also be possible to obtain
licenses from scientific and technical publications to use their work in
connection with this project.
To succeed, this process must uncover useful and relevant prior
art without overwhelming the patent examiner with information.
Community Patent Review will allow the Peer-to-Patent community
to rate the prior art for relevance, creating a searchable and sorted list

147. See 17 U.S.C. § I 07 (2000).
148. See 17 U.S.C. § 5 I 2(c) (2000).
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of infonnation for the USPT0. 149 If users assign a numerical rating to
a third party submission, software will be able to automatically sort
the material, outputting a list of the top ten submissions as judged by
the community. The system will forward only that "top ten" list to the
examiner. This winnows the submissions, making them more manageable for the examiner. Presumably, it will also cause the best submissions to rise to the top. Eventually, additional rating schemes,
including evaluative criteria provided by private systems, might be
incorporated to enhance the quality of available infonnation.
While software will automatically forward the top ten submissions to the USPTO at the end of the allotted time, the examiner will
still have access to the full list, which she can search as she would any
database. Those ten references can also be forwarded to the examiner
in the fonnat typically used by examiners when creating search reports.150 The examiner can use as few or as many of the public submissions as she desires.
There is always the danger that competitors, ideologues, and vandals will attempt to game any rating system. Given the high economic
stakes, it is likely that various parties will seek ways to cheat, whether
to improve the standing of their own submissions of prior art or to
suppress valid prior art submitted to defeat their own patents. While it
is desirable for anyone, including competitors, to dig up the best prior
art, the software must control against participants voting "early and
often" and thereby skewing the ratings. In addition to technical tracking mechanisms that log which computer does the voting, clear tenns
of service must forbid any gaming of the rating system. Transparency
in the voting process will also help to quell any impulses toward falsification.
However, even if the system is ultimately compromised, substantive patent examination is not harmed. Unlike Wikipedia, where generally any participant can change an entry, in Community Patent
Review the patent examiner remains the ultimate decision-maker. The
community review process does not derail substantive patent examination.
Finally, to encourage worthwhile participation and reward expertise in patent examination research, the system will award reputation
points. Just as on eBay, where the point system signals who is a trust-

149. Digg, a "user powered" news site," organizes its content based on similar principles.
The community decides which contributors and content are best and corresponding information rises to the top. See digg: All, http://digg.com/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2006).
150. These requirements are similar to those of an International Search Report filed by an
examiner in a Patent Cooperation Treaty ("PCT") review. In such a report, the examiner
cites prior art, indicates the claim to which such prior art speaks, and codes the relevance of
the submission. See MPEP, supra note 4, § 1844.01.
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worthy buyer or seller, 151 a similar reputation system here could be
used to signal expertise. These "karma effects" will accrue from subjective and objective criteria. Subjective rewards come from submitting prior art that is deemed relevant by the community. 152 Objective
rewards come from submitting prior art that is used by the patent examiner in making her determination. This might encourage participation, for example, by graduate students or junior scientists, eager for
professional recognition. The inventor might even extend a job offer
to a contributor with a high rating who submitted useful information
for the review of his application. While participants will be allowed
and encouraged to submit information about their "real world" identity and education, status will not be measured on the basis of these
traditional measures of expertise. Amateurs are capable of submitting
worthwhile prior art. Additionally, professionals may be reluctant to
identify themselves, uncertain about the appropriateness of participating in patent review on the job. 153 Hence the Peer to Patent software
should measure expertise based on the quality of participation in this
process, rather than with reference to external criteria.

151. For a description of eBay's rating system, see Evaluating a Member's Reputation,
http://pages.ebay.com/help/feedback/evaluating-feedback.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2006).
See also Peter Kollock, The Production of Trust in Online Markets, 16 ADVANCES GROUP
PROCESSES 99, I 00 (1999) ("Separating the two sides of the transaction by time or space
(such as purchasing something by mail or on credit) introduces greater risks. The party who
moves second must be considered trustworthy or have some other form of guarantee.").
152. There are numerous existing social reputation software systems. Some focus on
building social trust to support online social or dating relationships. These generally rate
participants based on whom they know, such as MySpace or Facebook. See MySpace,
http://www.myspace.com (last visited Nov. 19, 2006); Facebook, http://www.facebook.com
(last visited Nov. 19, 2006). Others, like Linkedln, provide a map of business relationships.
See Welcome to Linkedln, http://www.linkedin.com (last visited Nov. 19, 2006). Epinions
bills itself as a "web of trust" system that builds social networks of product reviewers. See
Reviews from Epinions, http://www.epinions.com (last visited Nov. 19, 2006). Kuro5hin
employs a time-weighted average of ratings to sort comments. See kuro5hin.org, FAQ Comments, http://www.kuro5hin.org/?op=special;page=comments (last visited Nov. 19,
2006). For additional examples, see Beth Simone Noveck, Trademark law and the Social
Construction of Trust: Creating the legal Framework for Online Identity, 83 WASH. U.
L.Q. 1733, 1752 & n.74 (2005).
153. Of course, this need not be the case. See Steven Lohr, Hoping to Be a Model, 1.8.M.
Will Put Its Patent Filings Online, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2006, at CS ("l.B.M. also said that
its technical experts will spend 'thousands of hours' a year scrutinizing the patent filings of
other companies.").
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Figure 1: Open Review Pilot Process
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By adding these mechanisms for public participation in the review of patent applications, it will hopefully be possible to empirically test the impact of the project on the quality of expertise and
participation, on examiner decision-making, and, ultimately, on the
resulting quality of the issued patent. By means of automated and
manual data collection during the course of the pilot, it will be possible to test the major hypotheses of the project: first, that the public is
capable of self-selecting on the basis of expertise and producing information relevant to the patent examination process; second, that an
open, human network of expertise will improve examiner work and
work product; and finally, that a publicly reviewed patent will satisfy
statutory criteria and, ultimately, result in greater licensing revenue
and lower litigation costs. With evidence that such a process is useful,
it will be possible to justify expanding this pilot program into institutionalized practice. It might also induce a change in the law to allow
examiners to communicate directly with the scientific public.

V. WHY OPEN REVIEW?
The Community Patent Review project opens up the process of
researching prior art to the public by dividing the prior art submission
process into manageable tasks: (1) submission of prior art and com-

152

Harvard Journal ofLaw & Technology

[Vol. 20

mentary in response to the pending application of a consenting applicant; (2) community identification of the claims that are most relevant; (3) generation of positive reputation points by successful
participation; and (4) automated transmission of information to the
patent examiner. This model of participation attempts to address the
problems of closed peer review while introducing more information
into the decision-making process.
There are strong reasons why inventors, examiners, and peer reviewers will want to participate in such a system.
A. For the Inventor

Inventors seek better information in order to strengthen their patent application. They want to know about relevant prior art before the
patent issues in order to avoid the cost of unnecessary litigation later.
Community Patent Review should help inventors uncover relevant
prior art through community vetting. As Professor Peter Canelias put
it, this system "affords the only real opportunity to implement the
statutory standard for obviousness." 154 By decreasing the probability
of later litigation, peer review should produce a stronger and more
valuable patent. Thus, inventors who prosecute through the peer review process should be able to extract more value when licensing
their patents than those who do not.
B. For the Patent Examiner

Examiners fear that public participation will create more work.
Furthermore, the USPTO, whose operations have been criticized, does
not want to expend any political capital on ineffective reforms. This
proposal is sensitive to these needs by supplying the examiner with an
independently generated "top ten" list of prior art references. This will
help produce information that is directly useful and also allow the
examiner to perform a more targeted and efficient search of the prior
art on the basis of know-how submitted by this "living database" of
human researchers. By virtue of having many public readers, applicants may write better-researched applications which, in tum, improve
examiner search practices. But even if Community Patent Review
154. E-mail from Peter Canelias, Adjunct Professor, New York Law School, to author
(Mar. 17, 2006, 18:26:56 EST) (on file with author). He continued:
[A] timely intervention by such a person is worth 10 expert witnesses
I 0 years after the fact. It also helps crystallize the knowledge in the
art within a particular time frame. One of the great difficulties in patent litigation, particularly with software, is reconstructing prior art
methods that were known to exist at the time of the invention, but
cannot be resurrected in sufficient detail to constitute clear and convincing evidence.
Id.
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does create more work for an examiner, if this cost comes with the
benefit of higher quality patents, it may be worth bearing.
C. For the Peer Reviewer
For peer contributors to participate, there must be tangible benefits to participation that outweigh the investment in time. The opportunity to produce better patent quality in their area of scientific
invention will motivate scientists. By increasing confidence in the
patent system, peer review can promote innovation, which benefits
everyone. Participation is more likely when participants know that
their contributions are likely to influence the final decision. In this
project, public participation will be tied directly to examiner decisionmaking. The software transmits contributed prior art directly to the
USPTO to ensure that there will be a meaningful connection between
reviewers' contributions and the final decision. In addition, contributors will be able to participate to varying degrees. While one might do
the necessary research to submit prior art, another might choose only
to rate the prior art submitted by another.

D. Public Benefits
In the United States, millions of dollars are spent on unnecessary
litigation and unjustified settlements that arise from patents that never
should have been issued. For the public, the primary goal is to improve the patent system. Community Patent Review addresses the
public interest by creating a system that could introduce more information into the process, defeating non-meritorious patent claims before they issue. The program aims to achieve that without falling into
the pitfalls of traditional peer review.
There are numerous aspects of the system's design that attempt to
improve the quality of issued patents, but openness is at the core of
the solution. Dismantling the institutionalized boundaries of insular
expertise allows public participants to self-select and introduce information into the process, transforming the fictional "person having
ordinary skill in the art" into a reality. 155 Open review jettisons the
classical conception of expertise. Philip Kitchner describes it:
155. Other proposals have sought to ground the PH OS IT A standard in reality by creating
incentives for the public to submit prior art. See, e.g., John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System: A Proposal for Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV.
305 (200 I) (arguing that by awarding prior art informants with a bounty assessed against
applicants, the USPTO can restore order to the patent system and reduce its social costs);
Joseph Scott Miller, Building a Better Bounty: litigation-Stage Rewards for Defeating
Patents, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 667 (2004); see also Michael J. Felton, A Cal/for Bounty
Hunters, PATENTS & PROP., Mar. 2001, at 57-58, available at http://pubs.acs.org/
subscribe/joumals/mdd/v04/i03/html/03patents.html (discussing a website that implements a
patent bounty by offering a reward for information that leads to the invalidation of a patent).
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When a handful of distinguished gentlemen came together in post-Restoration England to set up the
Royal Society, they agreed that membership should
be open only to the better sort. Allowing tradesmen
and artisans to join the collective search for truth
seemed too dangerous to be tolerated, for, after all,
the worldly interests of such people might corrupt
their decisions about what counted as genuine
156
knowledge.
If the aim is to find relevant prior art, the best knowledge may not
come from the center, but from the periphery, among the enthusiasts
or graduate students who are immersed in, but not yet well known for,
their knowledge of the discipline.
Opening up review will enable as many parties as possible to
monitor the peer review process. Participants will not be constrained
by professional allegiances. If successful, open peer review will resemble a scholarly debate - an open playing field where everyone
participates in a common conversation, whether they are in academia,
industry, or the public sector. This will not only inform the patent ex157
amination process, but also illuminate broader scientific debates.
The benefits of open review may extend beyond the process of
patent examination. Open review promotes deliberation about issues
of national importance, promoting social cohesion and good citizenship.158 Engaging the scientific community in patent review promotes
science education and science literacy. It puts scientific knowledge to
work for public purposes and democratizes the national conversation
about science and innovation.
Finally, open review increases public oversight over the regulatory process. It allows the public not only to vet but also to produce
the information on which regulatory decisions are based. This is especially valuable in the case of patent examination because the examiner
often does not possess the requisite information or understanding to
make informed decisions.

156. PHILIP KITCHER, SCIENCE, TRUTH, AND DEMOCRACY 29 (200 l ).
157. Openness and independence are critical to effective scientific discussion. See, e.g.,
E. Donald Elliott, Strengthening Science's Voice at EPA, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 45,
46 (2003) ("(G]ood science is a chorus of independent expert voices that come together with
sufficient coherence and force to constrain policy, structure debate, and influence policy.")
(footnote omitted).
158. See Reich, supra note 118, at 1631-32 ("[P]ublic deliberation helps transform individual valuations into social values; it helps forge collective purposes, and, even more important, helps define and refine public morality. Through such deliberations, individuals
become citizens.") (emphasis in original); see also Beth Simone Noveck, Designing Deliberative Democracy in Cyberspace: The Role of the Cyber-Lawyer, 9 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L.
1 (2003).
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Unlike a traditional peer review solution, an open review process
like Community Patent Review may be more expert and more participatory than both the status quo of patent examination and the closed
systems of scientific peer review employed in other agencies. This
model opens the policymaking process to more members of the scientific community and provides a platform to organize and evaluate
their input.
E. Possible Questions

The incentives for open patent review and participation in the
Commmunity Patent Review pilot are clear and powerful. Nonetheless, the proposed system is a significant departure from years of patent practice. As a result, I anticipate criticisms and questions to which
this Part will respond.
Could competitors use this system to misappropriate confidential
business information, suppressing innovation?

The Supreme Court has stated,
the pressure for secrecy is easily exaggerated, for if
the inventor of a process cannot himself ascertain a
'use' for that which his process yields, he has every
incentive to make his invention known to those able
to do so. Finally, how likely is disclosure of a patented process to spur research by others into the uses
to which the product may be put? To the extent that
the patentee has power to enforce his patent, there is
little incentive for others to undertake a search for
uses. 159
When an applicant files for a patent, it comes with the requirement of public information disclosure. Today, most applications are
published eighteen months after filing. Even if the inventor is taking
some risk with his disclosure, that risk is only of foregoing trade secret protection. The cost of disclosure to the inventor is small compared to the cost imposed on the public by a patent monopoly. If the
patentee does not want to forgo secrecy or does not feel that the patent
is meritorious enough to receive protection, he should not file for a
patent. There is no added harm associated with facilitating research
into the application, and, in fact, innovation might benefit from this
forum for discussion of pending patent applications. Tellingly, many

159. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966).
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companies have already consented to participate in Community Patent
Review.

Could contributing prior art in Community Patent Review create
the risk of increased liability for willful infringement?
Willful infringement imposes treble damages when an infringer
160
deliberately copies another's patented invention. However, knowledge of a pending application is generally insufficient to establish
161
willfulness.
Participation in the program occurs pre-grant, which
likely implies that courts will not find membership in the Peer-to162
Patent community probative of willfulness in later litigation. Penalizing participation in a public forum for researching prior art also contravenes the public policy of the patent system.

This proposal is too radical. How can the USPTO put the fate of
innovators in the hands ofthe public?
The Community Patent Review pilot does not eliminate the
USPTO, nor does it alter the substantive statutory standards used in
reviewing inventions. It preserves the scheme that has been in place
163
since 1952. Open review merely augments that scheme with a nonexpert institution akin to the jury system, a "radical" institution that
has been used since the 13th century. 164

Participants will game the system. How can you ensure that people won't place speed bumps and stumbling blocks in the path of their
competitors?
If people produce information that is useful to the examiner, their
personal agendas are irrelevant. Having many participants in the process will dilute the effects of unconstructive users. In existing social

160. See Chaparral Indus., Inc. v. Boman Indus., Inc., 697 F. Supp. 1113, 1124 (C.D. Cal.
1988).
161. See State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
162. See Yeen C. Tham, Memorandum on Willful Infringement and Community Patent
Review (Sept. 11, 2006), http://dotank.nyls.edu/communitypatent/willfulinfringement.pdf
(last visited Oct. 8, 2006).
163. The examination system has remained largely unchanged since the Patent Act of
1952. See Christopher M. Holman, 5 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 318, 318 (2006)
(observing that the now-dormant Patent Reform Act of 2005 "would have constituted the
most substantial and comprehensive package of patent law reforms since the Patent Act of
1952").
164. The use of a jury in English trials dates from 1215. Danny Danziger & John Gillingham, 1215: THE YEAR OF MAGNA CARTA 187 (Touchstone 2004)(2003).
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reputation system, norms frequently evolve to safeguard the quality of
participation. 165 We can expect something similar to happen here.
In addition, direct competitors might be prevented from rating a
particular invention. It is unproblematic to require each participant to
sign an affidavit representing that she does not have a conflict of in166
terest. The National Science Foundation,
the National Research
167
Council,
and the National Institutes of Health 168 all have wellestablished regulations and disclosure requirements to weed out conflicts among peer-review participants. The Community Patent Review
pilot could institute a similar policy.

Won't allowing non-governmental persons to have input into the
decision-making process decrease the system's impartiality?
You couldn't have a greater risk of bias than in the current system, in which a lone patent examiner rules on innovation without public oversight or review. The "wisdom of crowds" is generally more
accurate and more objective than the judgment of one uninformed
169
"expert."

Due to increased scrutiny, this program will effectively increase
the standard of review during the application process. If instituted in
widespread practice, wouldn't such a system cause fewer people to
apply for patents?
If those patents that remain untiled would not have survived the
threshold of public scrutiny, then this is a positive development. The
scientists, innovators, and inventors participating as contributing reviewers also rely on patents in their own work. While there are competitive economic interests that might create an incentive to submit
challenging prior art, the collective economic interests of the community drive towards producing the best quality patents. Only those patents that satisfy the statutory criteria ought to be granted.

165. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
166. See NAT'L SCI. FOUND., REPORT TO THE NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD ON THE NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION'S MERIT REVIEW PROCES FISCAL YEAR 2005 14 (2006),
http://www.nsf.gov/nsb/documents/2006/0306/merit_review.pdf.
167. See The Nat'! Acads., Policy on Committee Composition and Balance and Conflicts
of Interest for Committees Used in the Development of Reports (May 12, 2003),
http://www.nationalacademies.org/coi/bi-coi_form-O.pdf.
168. See Nat'! lnsts. of Health, NIH Conflict of Interest, Confidentiality and Non Disclosure Rules: Information for Reviewers of Grant Applications and R&D Contract Proposals
(Jan. 12, 2005), http://grants.nih.gov/grants/peer/COI_Information.pdf.
169. See SUROWIECKI, supra note 136, at xv.
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There are still an enormous number of patent applications.170 If
Community Patent Review is expanded, won't the workload be too
great for these non-professional peer contributors?
The pilot does not ask laypersons to be patent examiners but
merely to submit bibliographic information about that which they already know in their roles as scientists or innovators. Experts can
quickly answer questions in their field that identify prior art. The system's division of work allows for small "chunks" of participation.
Thus experts can make meaningful contributions to the community
without devoting large blocks of their schedule to Community Patent
Review. There are plenty of scientists, engineers, economists, consultants, and other professionals eligible to participate, especially
given that the grant of a twenty-year period of exclusivity is so economically significant to the future of science and industry. If the National Science Foundation can tap the more than 50,000 natural
scientists in the United States to review grant applications, the
USPTO should be able to solicit the participation of a vastly wider
network of experts - including those scientists for whom funding
depends on revenues from lucrative university patents.
If Community Patent Review were expanded from a pilot to a
more widespread system, there is also no need to ask the public to
review every patent. Attention could be directed only where the examiners encounter difficulties with their searching.

"Rational ignorance " 171 is intentionally built into the patent system. Since most patents are never litigated or even licensed, spending
too much time and money on initial review is a waste and "decisions
can be made much more efficiently in litigation. " 172 Why invest in
process review?
Mark Lemley's critique of ex ante reform did not consider the
possibility that additional prosecution costs could be borne by a "third
party" to the proceedings. Thus by engaging an outside community,
Community Patent Review sidesteps this problem. At the same time,
the program may reduce the costs of litigation by ensuring that patents

170. Inventors filed 409,532 patent applications in fiscal year 2005. See ANNUAL REsupra note 12, at 119 tbl. 2.
171. Lemley, supra note 37, at 1495.
172. Id. at 1531; see id. at 1510-11 ("[S]ociety ought to resign itself to the fact that bad
patents will issue, and attempt to deal with the problem ex post, if the patent is asserted in
litigation. This result is admittedly counterintuitive. It depends crucially on the fact that very
few patents are ever the subject of litigation, or even licensing. Because of this, money spent
improving the PTO examination procedures will largely be wasted on examining the ninetyfive percent of patents that will either never be used, or will be used in circumstances that
don't crucially rely on the determination of validity.") (footnote omitted).
PORT,
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issued with public scrutiny are stronger and more litigation-resistant.
Furthermore, this critique ignores the Supreme Court's clear statement
in a seminal patent case that "primary responsibility for sifting out
unpatentable material lies in the Patent Office" and "[t]o await litigation is - for all practical purposes - to debilitate the patent system."173 If the examiner, inventor, and the public can share the
burden, more information might be introduced into the process.

There will be too few participants. How will you recruit?
Building the community to participate in patent examination is
the greatest challenge. Even with the best technology and most considered process, without contributors the system will fail.
Fortunately, recruitment for the pilot has already begun. All the
companies that have volunteered their patents for peer review, including IBM and Microsoft, have committed to have their employees participate as peer reviewers. In the patenting process, the stakes are high
and self-interest will motivate participation. For many, the desire to
ensure that unpatentable subject matter in their area of art does not
pass muster will further motivate involvement. Moreover, the pilot
174
which concentrates on
will focus on Technology Center 2100,
175
software-related patents. This should engage a large community of
software developers with a strong spirit of volunteerism. There are
176
also many within that community who oppose patenting and will
want to participate in an effort to defeat bad patents.
Further recruitment initiatives will solicit participation from industry, universities, and academic technology transfer offices. Graduate students will want to participate in order to increase their standing
in the scientific community and gain recognition in their communities
of practice.
Finally, it is worth noting that over one million Wikipedia entries
are managed largely by only one thousand administrators. 177

173. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 18 (1966).
174. For a list of the US PTO Technology Centers, see US PTO, Patent Technology Centers, http://www.uspto.gov/web/info/pat-tech.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2006).
175. See Patent Technology Center 2100 Contact Info, http://www.uspto.gov/web/
info/2100.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2006).
I 76. See, e.g., Richard Stallman, Patent Absurdity, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED, June 5, 2004,
http://technology.guardian.co.uk/online/comment/story/O, 12449, 1510566,00.html.
177. See Wikipedia, Wikipedia: List of Administrators, http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Wikipedia:List_of_administrators (as of Nov. 19, 2006, 16:30 GMT).
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It will be hard to coordinate all these people. How will it be managed?
Many large systems like the program contemplated here have
operated successfully online. Their success stems from having wellthought out practices that allow participants to see clearly the community of which they are a part, to understand their role within the
group, to participate simply and easily in the process, and to see the
178
outcome. If eBay can coordinate millions of auctions every day,
then this modest pilot can be built, leaving opportunities to evolve and
improve over time.

Don't small inventors stand to suffer from this process? Won't
this increase the costs of obtaining a patent and the risk that it will
not be granted?
Small inventions receive equal consideration in this system and
even the work of unknown inventors may receive useful attention
from the community. While some patent applications may be of
greater interest to the public than others, public willingness to participate is not contingent upon the size of the inventor. This process does
not delay substantive examination. To the contrary, participation
speeds up consideration by allowing all applicants, regardless of size,
to be reviewed first. Applicants are not obligated to review every
piece of information found by the public nor are they required to
amend their information disclosure statements before the USPTO. The
Community Patent Review system functions as an adjunct search service for the examination. It does not alter the obligations of the patentee. The USPTO will provide this assurance to consenting
applicants who participate in the pilot.

Can this process be privatized?
Possibly. A peer review process will be most effective and create
the greatest incentives for participation if it meaningfully connects to
administrative process. A direct connection to a legal decision-making
process confers legitimacy and relevance on peer review. At the same
time, private third parties are already offering services to discuss and
179
deliberate about granted (and, increasingly, published) patents. It is
178. See eBay: The World's Online Marketplace, http://pages.ebay.com/aboutebay/
thecompany/companyoverview.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2006) ("On any given day, there
are millions of items available through auction-style and fixed-price trading.").
179. See, e.g., WikiPatents- Community Patent Review, http://www.wikipatents.com
(last visited Nov. 19, 2006); About the CAMBIA Patent Lens, http://www.patentlens.net/
daisy/patentlens/patentlens.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2006); EFF: Patent Busting Project,
http://www.eff.org/patent/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2006).
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possible that these approaches can be combined. The Peer to Patent
system might act as a conduit through which third-party data could be
channeled to the USPTO.

If we implement open review, what happens to the prosecution
history? How will a record be created for litigation?
The Peer to Patent process creates a strong, robust, and informed
record for review. With the entire peer review process conducted
online, it can be recorded and archived in its entirety, making information also accessible to the inventor. Only information transmitted
to the examiner will form part of the record, just as in any examiner
search.

VI. CONCLUSION: INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE AND PA TENT
REFORM

Patent reform has been incremental at best, with no major
changes to the examination system since the Patent Act was enacted
in 1952. Open review presents an alternative avenue for legal reform
by enhancing the institutional competence of the USPTO. This proposal focuses on the institution that makes the decisions, employing
technologically-enhanced information and communications practices
to improve its work. Instead of seeking reform through the slower
mechanisms of judicial review, this proposal addresses its administrative law antecedents by revolutionizing the process of patent examination.
Moreover, even if we were to change the legislative standards by
which patent determinations are made, without adequate information
to enable good decisions, meaningful reform is not possible. Agencies
depend on good information to do their work - whether it is determining patentability or air quality standards - and the Patent Office
currently lacks the institutional mechanisms and culture to benefit
from outside expertise.
The pilot program could also spur empirical and data-driven reform.180 The legal profession often prefers "anecdotes to tables," 181
and legislative change is not necessarily supported by empirical
data. 182 Introducing a verifiable process makes it possible to test its
180. Cf David A. Hyman, An Outsider Per~pective on Intellectual Property Discourse,
in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 275, 278 (F. Scott
Kieff ed., 2003) (discussing evident lack of concern about the dearth of empirical evidence
in legal scholarship).
181. Id. at 279.
182. See David A. Hyman, lies, Damn lies, and Narrative, 73 IND. L.J. 797, 836-37
( 1998) (noting that anecdotal evidence can be exploited to produce legislative change that is
unjustified by empirical data).

162

Harvard Journal of Law & Technology

[Vol. 20

impact on the patent system and ascertain if the measure truly promotes the progress of the "useful arts." Rather than prompting prolonged guesswork as to which legal reforms will address the patent
crisis - wondering whether a change in the standard of judicial review or a reform of the obviousness standard will, in fact, improve
patent quality - open patent review will both create and stimulate
progress. Information from the pilot can be used to inform examination and see what works and what does not. We can then lobby Congress for more thoroughgoing legislative change, armed with concrete
data. Furthermore, the results of this program will help us develop
new models and new technologies that will solicit public input to improve regulatory decision-making.
The new type of digital institution for which this Article argues
combines scientific and legal decision-making using online tools. Instead of one examiner, an application can have a thousand! The new
generation of social software might not only make it easier to find
friends but also to find expertise that can be applied to legal and policy decision-making. 183 This way, we can improve upon the Constitutional promise to promote the progress of science and the useful arts
in our democracy by ensuring that only worthy ideas receive that
"odious monopoly" of which Thomas Jefferson complained. 184

183. See CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS, PROGRESSIVE PRIORITIES: AN ACTION
AGENDA FOR AMERICA 253 (2005), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/projects/
progressivepriorities/prog_priorities.pdf.
184. See Walterscheid, supra note 7 (noting that Jefferson was "not convinced" that the
Patent Act of 1793 was "either desirable or particularly useful"). Along the same lines,
Irving Wladawsky-Berger, IBM Vice President of Technology and Strategy, said of the U.S.
Patent Office, "[A]ny idiot can get a patent for something that should never be granted a
patent." Robert McMillan, IBM Exec: U.S. Could learn from EU, China Patent Policy,
INFOWORLD, Apr. 7, 2005, available at http://www.infoworld.com/article/05/04/07/
HNpatentpolicy_ l .html.

